The Election of Pope Julius II marks the turning point in Cesare Borgia’s attempt to convert inherited fortune into durable rule. Cesare had built substantial power in Romagna and had prepared for the death of his father, Pope Alexander VI, but he failed to prevent the elevation of a pope who had both reason to fear him and the authority to undo his position. In the book’s political logic, the election is not a minor error in succession management: it is the immediate cause of Cesare’s ultimate downfall.

Political Situation and Stakes

The election occurred at the moment when Cesare’s position was most vulnerable. Pope Alexander VI had died after Cesare had spent only five years building his power, leaving Romagna consolidated but the rest of his plans unsettled. Cesare was gravely ill, almost at the point of death, while two powerful hostile armies pressed against him. His survival therefore depended not only on the territories and forces he had assembled, but also on the identity of the next pope, whose office could determine whether his state endured or collapsed.

Cesare nevertheless had prepared for many of the dangers that Alexander’s death might bring. He later told the narrator, on the day Julius II was created, that he had foreseen and provided for everything except the possibility that he himself would be at death’s door when his father died. That admission defines the election’s tragic imbalance: his political calculations were extensive, but they could not compensate for the physical incapacity that prevented him from using them.

Cesare’s Preparations and Remaining Leverage

The strength of Cesare’s foundations was shown by Romagna’s continued loyalty. The province waited for him for more than a month, and he remained safe in Rome even though the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini came to attack him without success. His position was therefore not already disintegrating when Alexander died. He retained influence, armed supporters, and enough political credit to make the papal election a contest over the future balance of power.

Cesare could not ensure the election of the candidate he preferred, but he could prevent the election of candidates whom he disliked. That negative power was crucial. A pope hostile to Cesare would not need to defeat him immediately in the field; the pope could exploit the uncertainty surrounding his territories, his illness, and his dependence on shifting alliances. The election thus turned on the use of a limited but decisive form of political control: if Cesare could not choose his protector, he still needed to exclude his enemies.

The Fatal Choice

The narrator identifies Cesare’s central mistake as his participation in the election of Julius II. Cesare should never have consented to the elevation of a cardinal whom he had injured or who, on becoming pope, would have reason to fear him. Among those named are San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio. Most of the other cardinals likewise had grounds for fear, with the exceptions of d’Amboise and the Spanish cardinals: the Spanish cardinals were constrained by their connections and obligations, while d’Amboise possessed power through his relations with the French Court.

The safer course would have been to work first for the election of a Spanish pope. If that failed, Cesare should have accepted d’Amboise. The one course he should have rejected was the elevation of San Pietro ad Vincula, who became Julius II. The analysis rests on a broader warning about political memory: recent benefits do not reliably erase old injuries. Cesare’s earlier favors could not be trusted to neutralize the resentment and apprehension of men whom he had offended.

Consequences and Historical Significance

The book states directly that Cesare’s error in the election caused his ultimate downfall. This judgment does not deny the quality of his broader statecraft. On the contrary, Cesare is offered as a model for a new prince who must remove enemies, conciliate friends, use force or fraud, secure fear without hatred, command obedient soldiers, alter established institutions, and maintain relations with powerful rulers so that aiding him appears advantageous and offending him dangerous. His failure lay in the one decision that determined whether those achievements would survive the death of his father.

The election also illustrates the book’s distinction between personal ability and Fortune. Cesare had obtained his principality through the favorable fortunes of his father, yet he had worked to establish his own foundations and to replace dependence with independent strength. His use of French auxiliaries, followed by mercenary forces associated with the Orsini and Vitelli, and finally troops of his own raising, traced a movement toward self-reliance; his reputation increased as he became master of his own forces. The papal election interrupted that development at the decisive moment. The result was a reversal in which a carefully constructed political project was undone not by a lack of intelligence or energy, but by a single misjudgment compounded by illness and the extraordinary malignity of Fortune.

The event gains further force from the book’s comparison of different political orders. A state governed by a sole prince and replaceable servants concentrates authority in the ruler, whereas a kingdom surrounded by hereditary barons contains independent powers capable of opening the way to an invader and later obstructing his rule. Cesare’s position similarly depended on controlling the surrounding political structure: his territorial foundations could be strong, but the papacy remained an office through which hostile interests could be organized. Julius II’s election exposed that vulnerability and transformed a limitation of Cesare’s power into the instrument of his collapse.